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‘We Are Also Here.’ Whose Revolution Will
Democracy Be?
Judith Vega
In 1796, inspired by the so-called Batavian Revolution, a small satirical Dutch
journal related the ‘minutes’ of a newly erected organisation ‘We are also here’
(‘Wij zijn er óók nog’).1 Its title may, for all its humoristic and ironic intent, have
been the most succinct summary imaginable of the quintessential message of
democratic revolts. In this particular case, however, the message was more pre-
cisely framed – directed at the revolutionaries themselves. Writing about a
women’s association, it contained a tongue-in-cheek statement of the desire of
women to be included in the democratic revolts that were evolving in end-eight-
eenth-century Europe. It served to remind its readers of the democratic tenet of
popular sovereignty (the ‘we’ of democracy), as well as of the heterogeneity of
that very people. Citizens, it was made clear, have specific identities and interests,
and exclusions from citizenship – whether in legal or social senses – easily occur
on the basis of such differences.
A good two hundred year history of revolutions later, in which many kinds of
democracy have been fought – and died – for, the eighteenth-century rallying cry
still rings familiar. The most recent challenge to autocratic regimes has unfolded
in the Middle East. The present ‘Arab Spring’ has many national faces and many
dynamics, differing in economic, cultural, and political respects – both between
the countries involved and within them. Whereas ‘we are also there’ is surely the
shared mantra of the Arab revolts (though not necessarily its original gendered
message), apart from this quintessential democratic outcry, not much else is
shared. And the Middle East situations do not seem to favour the hope for recog-
nition of the heterogeneity of the people – in particular in view of its genders, but
also otherwise.
The Tunisian hero Mohamed Bouazizi, a fruit and vegetables street vendor,
sparked a mass revolt when he, in protest against his arbitrary arrest by the
police, set himself on fire in December 2010 and sadly died some weeks after-
wards. In June 2010 in Egypt, Khaled Said, a young blogger, was killed by the
police, which, again, eventually led to a popular revolt. The onsets of these first
two revolutions of the Arab Spring were respectively economic and political in
nature. Together they represent the usual two-fold reasons for the outburst of
democratic demands. They show how freedom always has both political and eco-
nomic facets. They affirm the view of democracy as a simultaneously legal and
material practice of popular self-rule, or, of the mutual interdependence of liberal
1 Janus verrezen, no. 42, Monday January 18, 1796, 293-98. While clearly a burlesque, I hesitate to
use the word ‘fictive,’ as women’s meetings did arise at the time – the empirical reference point
of the skit.
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and social democracy. But one more dimension of democracy is, time and again,
in play: the impact of culture and identity on the experience – and the rights – of
citizenship. Today we would say that democratic, egalitarian citizenship must dis-
count the differences between citizens, and secure the participation of all, if it is
to be more than a mere formal liberal democracy. This formula saddles democracy
with a triple agenda. If economy and politics present democracy with issues of the
‘what’, culture – to choose this inapt shorthand for civic difference and particular-
ity – presents democracy with issues of the ‘who.’2
Revolutions, like real-world democracies, carry their proper exclusions and vio-
lence – regardless of the very justified ends they may pursue. Such exclusions and
violence can occur on all three analytic axes: economic, political and cultural sup-
pressions. The latter should not be forgotten. The sexual and other violence
towards women, often in the full publicity of Tahrir Square,3 did not so much
define the nature of the Egyptian revolution nor its necessary evolution, as estab-
lish a sad relationship with a lengthy Western history of revolutions which
reveals women’s vulnerable status in democratic revolutions from the eighteenth
century onwards. This reminds us that the origins of modernity, or modern-day
democracies, might be related in terms of either tyrannicide or patricide. These
distinct tales give rise to very different histories and diagnoses of both revolu-
2 I borrow this distinction from Nancy Fraser, ‘Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World,’ New Left
Review 36 (2005): 69-88.
3 Many incidents of military, police and civilian men committing acts of violence towards women
protesters have been reported. The sexual assault by a male mob on CBS-reporter Lara Logan, at
the occasion of the celebration of Mubarak’s fall (February 2011), also mentioned by Winter, was
extensively covered by a variety of media. For a commentary see <www.feministe.us/blog/
archives/2011/02/16/lara-logan-assaulted-in-egypt/> (accessed March 21, 2012). On the basis of
various telephone videos unearthed at that occasion, not showing Logan, it is suspected that
other, Egyptian, women were also attacked. The beating and torture of a woman by military men
in December 2011 was as extensively covered by a variety of media (with footage on YouTube
under the capture ‘Blue Bra Woman’). The infamous virginity tests were conducted by the mili-
tary after Mubarak’s overthrow. The web is rife with complaints of continuing sexual harassment
of women in the Egyptian streets. In Libya, November 2011 a Women March was held in remem-
brance of the victims of sexual assault during the war against Gaddafi. Their banners read ‘You
are not alone’ – one more crucial phrase pointing to democracy’s proper outcasts. See Marie-
Louise Gumuchian, ‘Libyan women demand support for war rape victims,’ November 26, 2011,
at <http://uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=UKTRE7AP0F420111126> (accessed March 22,
2012). Next to the sexual and other physical violence, many problems exist regarding women’s
post-revolutionary political representation. I merely report (some of) the well-known facts in
order to establish the gender issues of the ‘democratic revolutions’ more firmly than Steven Win-
ter allows for – not to insinuate an ‘Arab propensity’ in that respect, nor to underplay the other
than gender-related violence attaching to the revolutions. An extensive debate in this regard
ensued after the publication of Mona Eltahawy’s article on sexual violence in the Arab world
(‘Why do they hate us?,’ Foreign Policy, May/June 2012).
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tions and the resulting democracies.4 From one perspective we see idealised,
generic individuals before the democratic law, from the other a victorious broth-
erhood ruling modern publicity. The public sphere, then, is both feminism’s hope
and problem.
Steven Winter’s paper on democratic freedom is a wide-ranging, inspiring and
necessary plea to preserve social democratic ideals over and against the host of
neoliberal reformulations of democracy that we witness nowadays. Winter is con-
cerned with the contemporary state of democracy, which suffers from a range of
critical issues. These would include, using my own examples: employees being
required to redefine their labouring selves in increasingly competitive terms; a
citizenship that appears to be either receding into the clientalism of a cut-down
welfare state, or reformulated into a kind of entrepreneurship accentuating indi-
vidual assertiveness and responsibility; a consumerism which has won our hearts
and minds as the default medium for the satisfaction of our desires and our hap-
piness.
Winter begins by sketching the two waves of democratisation in 1989 and 2010
as representing the two different roads this democratisation could take: market
individualism or democratic equality. The latter, associated by Winter with the
2010 Arabic Spring, would inspire the better road – towards a real social democ-
racy fighting off atomistic individualism. He argues that democracy must be dis-
associated from liberalism or market ideology, outlining two contrasting
approaches to freedom, and a postmodern view of subjectivity as ‘situated’ and in
need of social forms of recognition. This eventually leads him to plead a republi-
can conception of social democracy. In its general intent, I couldn’t applaud more
such a project of recovering democratic values from their increasingly liberal and
neoliberal framings, and I have myself in many instances defended the usefulness
of a (neo)republican approach to citizenship and democracy – and to feminism.5
Still, I am not comfortable with the premise that starts off and further governs
Winter’s line of argument: the sharp distinction between individualist and social
4 See e.g., Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988); Janet Flower Mac-
Cannell, The Regime of the Brother. After the Patriarchy. (London: Routledge, 1991). Sigmund
Freud, in his Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse (Mass Psychology and Ego-Analysis) (1921), used
the familial analogues of rejection of and identification with the father for describing mass
movements, distinguishing these mechanisms from an egalitarian identification between the
members of the mass, characterised by demanding isomorphism and holding off difference.
5 Examples are: ‘A Neorepublican Cultural Citizenship: Beyond Marxism and Liberalism,’ in Cul-
tural Citizenship in Political Theory, ed. Judith Vega & Pieter Boele van Hensbroek (London: Rout-
ledge, 2012), 15-30 (also Citizenship Studies 14 [3] [2010]: 259-74); Isabelle de Charrière en de kri-
tiek van de Verlichting. Filosofie, politiek, cultuur (Kampen: Klement, 2005); ‘Enlightenment’s Dif-
ferences, Today’s Identities,’ in States and Citizens. History, Theory, Prospects, ed. Quentin Skinner
& Bo Stråth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 115-30; ‘Feminist Republicanism
and the Political Perception of Gender,’ in Republicanism: a Shared European Heritage, vol. II, ed.
Quentin Skinner & Martin van Gelderen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
157-74; Inventing Enlightenment’s Gender. The Representation of Modernity in Dispute (PhD diss.,
Leiden University, 1998), <http://dissertations.ub.rug.nl/faculties/non-rug/1998/VegaJA/>.
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revolutions. To stay for a moment with Winter’s initial examples, they seem to
form a fairly arbitrary starting point, given the similarities that we may also per-
ceive between the two sets of events. We may want to pause before we dub the
Arab Spring – even in its early days – the exemplary situation of the second, social
road to democracy. The 1989 revolutions too, featured the egalitarian and uto-
pian enthusings of the effervescing democratic and cooperative mood that Winter
attributes to 2010, in particular to the Tahrir Square sit-ins. There were the jubi-
lant gatherings around the Berlin Wall, where guitars and cameras accompanied
the solidary cry ‘we are the people’, or that year’s ‘Velvet Revolution’ in Czechoslo-
vakia, with non-violent protesters presenting flowers to the police, conveying the
shared interests of people and police. If in hindsight we may characterise the
1989 revolt in Winter’s manner, we know too little yet of the future of the Arab
uprisings to predict what varieties of democracy will be their outcome. Revolu-
tions are polyphonic; they usually express, as indicated above, several motivations
at once.6
This boils down to an empirical doubt about Winter’s train of thought in taking
the 2010 revolutions as exemplary. But there are more basic, argumentative and
theoretical issues in the argument he builds from this example. My doubts about
the paper’s general premise led me to further probe the relation between democ-
racy and the market as sketched by Winter. He hesitates between equating and
opposing these, which is the same as saying that he insufficiently differentiates
between them historically and systematically. This results in his normative ideal
of social democracy requiring a kind of baron von Münchhausen act: it has no
firm empirical ground from which to drag it into existence.
The main two problems I identify, then, are these: the pictured opposition of
individualist and social struggles, and an insufficient empirical as well as theoreti-
cal distinction of democracy and market. I will discuss these problems under
three headings. First, I will problematise Winter’s portrayal of liberal theory.
Rather than identifying it one-sidedly with a market approach to society and indi-
vidualism, we may point out several conceptual tensions inherent in liberal demo-
cratic theory as such. Winter rightly quotes Roosevelt’s ‘four liberties,’ which
combine individual and social rights, and thus indicate one of the internal con-
ceptual tensions.7 Moreover, liberalism harbours conceptual resources that may
strengthen its better tenets if called upon (in particular its Kantian ones).
The second problem I identified leads me to discuss Winter’s conceptualisation of
democracy. One of democracy’s crucial characteristics, the public sphere, has too
shadowy a presence in the paper, and becomes a sort of deus ex machina at the
6 This is not to deny that the notions of liberal and social democracy do refer to different political
goals and strategies. They might be usefully distinguished, to mention one eminent aspect, as to
their foregrounding rights and participation respectively. Then again, even there crossovers
occur, notably in the concepts of social and cultural rights.
7 Judith Shklar traces the social side of the claims of American citizenship even further back, see
her American Citizenship. The Quest for Inclusion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1991).
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end. I will distinguish it from civil society, a concept only implicitly present in
Winter’s characterisation of democracy. I will argue that this distinction serves to
provide a better look at democracy’s proper, empirical history. It can furthermore
elucidate what is involved in democratic freedom, including its fate in the projects
of the Arab Spring.
Finally, I want to address Winter’s take on the idea of social selves in relation to
freedom. I can readily agree with Winter’s notion of socially situated selves. How-
ever, it merely describes an ontological condition, saying little about the unfold-
ing of life stories or the directions these might or should take. It implicates an ‘is,’
but not much ‘ought.’ Furthermore, it again poses the problem of how to frame
liberal freedom, giving occasion to critically review Winter’s identification of neg-
ative freedom with market freedom. I will further address the problem of free-
dom from authority by consulting intellectual and cultural history on the fickle
symbolics of market and democracy when it comes to resisting authority. These
historical perspectives reveal the gender intricacies of the implications for free-
dom attached to market and democracy.
1 Liberal Theory: Individualist Premises and Kantian Ends
For one thing, the various bodies of democratic thought that Winter mentions as
sharing the same ‘core intuitions’ or ‘the same premise’ as to their concept of the
individual, do not share these intuitions.8 The debate Winter wants us to engage
in covers crucially distinct positions within political philosophy, many of which
concur with his mission. The notion of socially constructed selves or the principle
of intersubjectivity that Winter defends, characterise both the deliberative and
republican theories of democracy, not to mention feminist ones. The bulk of con-
tinental theories of democracy – and American ones such as those of John Dewey
and, arguably, John Rawls – subscribe to a social concept of freedom.9 The paper’s
intended culprit, then, seems to be more specific: a liberalism in its economic lib-
ertarian sense, which insists on a radically market oriented worldview where free-
dom is indeed embodied in, and exhausted by, mere transactions (rather than
interactions) between unencumbered agents.
A further, methodological, problem adds to this lack of focus. The paper at times
suffers from what Michael Walzer has called two contradictory critiques of liber-
alism: either liberalism is attacked for its faulty theory, or its faulty practice.
Liberalism either doesn’t describe the real world well, for no one really is that iso-
lated, atomised subject, or it does tell the truth about the world, and then that
asocial world is wrong.10 Winter, for his part, incurs a similar reproach. He critici-
ses a historically developed double bind of democracy and market, only to subse-
8 Winter, ‘Down Freedom’s Main Line,’ in this issue, Sections 1 and 2.
9 Though we may discern a new tendency within political philosophy of narrowing its scope to for-
mal approaches.
10 Michael Walzer, ‘The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,’ Political Theory 18 (1) (1990): 6-23.
282 Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 2012 (41) 3
‘We Are Also Here.’ Whose Revolution Will Democracy Be?
quently list the very different realities of ‘real-world democracies’ compared to
markets.11 He first tells us that the world is deeply and direly ‘liberal,’ and then
that the world is not at all as liberal theory presents it. This does provide a conun-
drum, if only in strategic respect. If democracy as such has been captured by the
market from the outset, how could it ever provide an escape from that market?
Or, conversely, how did we ever get to the real-world democracy in the first place?
Some more details on the relation of democracy and the market, in historic and
axiologic respects, may get us out of this quandary and give us a normative view
grounded on some part of democracy’s empirical reality. I will return to this in the
next section.
Let us first attempt to unravel what is at stake in the democratic critique of lib-
eral theory. Liberalism did produce the real world it theorised, but did not do so
univocally. If it installed a certain marketised and individualistic symbolic order,
the various discourses of democracy, including liberalism’s proper representative
politics, saddle it with various irritating imageries and practices.12 What is more,
liberalism contains its own paradoxes, such as its dual foundation in individual
liberty plus the equality of all, or its principles of popular sovereignty plus creat-
ing government with institutional checks for mitigating the former’s potential
abuses. One more such paradox concerns its twofold principles of negative and
positive freedom that together provide the absence of arbitrary governmental
interference and some level of security of subsistence. Such paradoxes constitute
tensions internal to liberal democracy, tensions that cannot be finally solved but
must precisely be honoured and kept alive.13 Neoliberalism is not democratic
because it has dropped one of the balls to be juggled, translating popular sover-
eignty into a fundamentalist individual liberty-as-licence for all.14 Still, Winter’s
rendering of the relation between market and democracy does not take this road
of critique, and actually portrays it as neoliberalism’s wettest dream come true. I
venture to take on both (neo)liberalism’s and Winter’s rendering of the relation
between market and democracy.
11 Winter, ‘Down Freedom’s Main Line,’ Section 2.
12 To suggest some examples, besides representative democracy, from the wide range of non-mar-
ket oriented approaches to democracy: republican, anarchist, pragmatist, or deliberative forms of
participatory democracy, communism, utopian socialism, sexual libertarianism, nineteenth-cen-
tury politically inspired radical philosophy, feminism in its various historical and contemporary
formulations, multicultural democracy. From the Levellers, the Communards, the suffragettes,
the Berkeley free speech movement, up to Occupy, democracy has been primarily a socio-political
– and often cultural – discourse, continuously engaging with the legacies of a more narrowly
defined liberalism.
13 I might remark here that crucially different answers to this paradox have been developed on the
two sides of the Atlantic (perhaps accounting for some of the differences between Winter and
myself), and that practical politics may indeed tilt in unwanted directions. Still, both in Europe
and the U.S.A. political disputes precisely revolve around how to substantiate these paradoxes. If
anything, American politics has suffered from a tendency to insufficiently honour the ineluctable
paradoxes of liberal democracy. The best strategy might be to return politics to them.
14 In addition to the ‘Austrian school’ of economics, Robert Nozick’s notion of liberal justice would
be a case in point. See his Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974).
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Winter’s account seems tainted, first, by a too ready identification of political lib-
eralism and neoliberal market liberalism, and second, by an insufficient conceptu-
alisation of what democracy as a specific societal order is about: that is, one not
exhausted by economic principles. First of all, liberal theory is a difficult caption
as it comprises many different and even incompatible approaches. The Schumpe-
terian kind of aggregative theory of democracy, hinging on the calculating citizen,
has been long overturned by normative theories guided by moral precepts (in
either Rawlsian or Habermasian flavours). These dispute the former’s instrumen-
tal view of democracy as well as its descriptive pretence: democracy is not defined
by aggregating preferences. These theories, in part, hark back to Kant. Winter
characterises Kantian autonomy as a philosophical, not a political ideal, and as
unsuited for collective democratic practice.15 But Kant did not merely bequeath to
us some flawed pre-Hegelian view of personal autonomy or a solipsistic individu-
alism. He sketched the basics of a political morality that was to overcome mere
interest or aggregative politics, and still guides prominent present-day ‘social’
theories of democracy (both of the redistributive liberal and the deliberative neo-
marxist kinds). If this is to be called liberalism, it insists on a state where ‘no
member should be a mere means, but should also be an end,’16 thus obliging the
republic to embody a moral Kingdom of Ends – yielding the political life of the
categorical imperative.17
Winter, then, too readily dismisses the political and democratic relevance of
Kantian ethics. The Kantian practice of freedom is tied up both with moral obliga-
tion and, in Linda Zerilli’s wordings, with political judgment ‘as a way of con-
structing or discovering community through the articulation of individuality
rather than its suppression, for this articulation will always involve taking the
perspectives of others into account.’18 Such an insistence on the subjective import
of freedom, intrinsically connected with a principle of ‘publicity’ without which
subjective judgment would be senseless, may be deemed to be and to have been
present in some way in all imaginable democratic revolts. It also complies with, or
even spawns, the tenet that liberty and equality constitute a relation internal to
democracy, meaning that the two principles are to be active in tandem.
15 Winter, ‘Down Freedom’s Main Line,’ Section 4.
16 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, ed. J.C. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952),
Part II, 23.
17 To state the point more generally, a Kantian inspired view of democracy as a moral practice,
which obliges to take the other into account both on the subjective and political level, would dis-
allow the kind of ‘individualising’ of democracy that Winter challenges. I don’t dispute that philo-
sophical humanism carries all sorts of problems as to the notion of the subject. I merely contend
that it consists of many branches and conceptual angles, some of which offer handles on think-
ing intersubjectivity and moral instead of solipsistic action.
18 Linda M.G. Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2005), 159. Zerilli here discusses feminist practices of freedom in connection with Hannah
Arendt’s discussion of Kant. See for Arendt’s view of Kantian judgment her Lectures on Kant’s
Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
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Below I will further discuss how to better frame democracy as a societal order
characterised by the non-economical empirical and normative resources it has to
offer.
2 Situating Democracy: between Civil Society and Public Sphere
In his attempt to conceptualise democracy as distinct from the market, Winter
offers a list of the characteristics of ‘real-world democracies’ that counter the
market’s aggregative orientation: protection of minorities, rights of personal
expression, and a civil society that provides occasions for cooperative practices.19
The list is well enough, but for one omitted crucial feature of democracy: its pub-
lic sphere. Winter follows Hannah Arendt and the ancient republicans in admon-
ishing that self-governance requires politics, therewith implying, but still curi-
ously omitting, these authors’ favoured societal domain. The range of institutions
he lists, where socialisation takes place and cooperation is encouraged, working
against market individualism, may conveniently be termed the realm of ‘civil soci-
ety.’ Civil society is indeed one of modernity’s inevitable societal spheres, a field
of organisations separate from the state, ranging from churches to sports and
from reading clubs to labour unions. It is, however, not the only one. I do not pre-
tend to canvass in any measure the profuse field of theories of civil society and
public sphere; I will merely attempt to have the two concepts point to pertinent
distinctions between democratic practices.20
Whereas in its early Hegelian formulation, civil society stood for the market soci-
ety over and against state politics, in twentieth-century definitions it mostly indi-
cated the realm outside of state and market. The latter is clearly the definition
that would fit Winter’s intention. The public sphere is as necessary a part of mod-
ern politics as civil society. It is distinct from civil society in mediating more
expressly the political relations between citizenry and state, and providing checks
on both state and market. Let me further clarify the distinction by lending the
concepts some markers which may tease out their different democratic function-
alities. If civil society stands for things such as socialisation, togetherness, coop-
eration, consensus, mutuality, shared language, affirmation of sociality, apology
of conventional community then public sphere stands for things like contesta-
tion, agonism, deconstruction, political action, counter-communities, language
play and irony, emulation, power play. Neither, let me be clear, is without its
faults and drawbacks, or its laudable and dignifying feats. Nor do they, to be
clearer still, coincide with ‘left’ or ‘right’ politics. They are, moreover, interde-
pendent. But they do reveal different socialising dynamics.
Arendt made such a distinction when she pronounced a severe scepticism with
regard to contemporary society, which in her view had lost its public life in con-
19 Winter, ‘Down Freedom’s Main Line,’ Section 2.
20 One seminal discussion of civil society is Jean L. Cohen & Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political
Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
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ceding to an economic orientation on labour and consumption.21 She opposes the
public sphere’s ‘political’ relationships to ‘social’ or ‘household’ relations, which
yield mere privatised experiences of ‘the same.’ What she castigated as ‘the inva-
sion of the public realm by society,’22 was a loss of the inter homines esse: the state
of being among men beyond any suggestion of natural community. The public
realm is the space of action and speech among others, which enables the disclo-
sure of personal uniqueness and humanity’s irreducible plurality. Its loss amounts
to the subject’s ‘loss of the world.’
If Arendt was too idealistic anywhere, it was in her adherence to a public sphere
under the sign of self-disclosure. Power for her is never an individual possession.
It only comes about in the doing, among other men, and arises from the irreduci-
ble plurality of mankind. However, the performance of uniqueness itself may
often be the very capacity to be mastered, especially for those new to existing
public contexts. Public spheres are not necessarily hospitable spaces to minorities
or women, as both our eighteenth-century satire and the Tahrir Square illustrate.
But then again, we may proffer that these instances merely testify to the disap-
pearance of ‘public sphere’ – again in Arendt’s spirit.23 As publicity with her is not
a spatial but a political and normative concept, it evaporates when it insuffi-
ciently caters to plurality.
Jürgen Habermas, a prominent philosopher of public action, presented modern-
ity as typified by an original practice of modern democratic publicity, which arose
in the course of the eighteenth century. He characterises this modern public
sphere as a situation of intersubjective communication, by means of information
media.24 While it partly arose from market activities, the full-grown public sphere
is to be distinguished from that traditional liberal domain of civil society – it was
to become a critical instrument vis-à-vis both market and state. In a further
move, Habermas also distinguishes the public sphere from those lifeworld activi-
ties that are ‘innerworldly’ rather than politically directed. A good deal of the
mentioned civil society associations would fall under this Habermasian definition
of an ‘apolitical’ part of the lifeworld. This is not the place to enter into the details
and problems of Habermas’s public sphere theory. I will here merely note one cru-
cial feature of that approach. Habermas’s bifurcation of the lifeworld into ‘pri-
vate’ and ‘public’ activities was meant to draw out a freestanding concept – publi-
city – that could inaugurate the normative (as contrary to the instrumental or
aggregative) framing of democracy. Civil society as such does not already do the
work.
21 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
22 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 221.
23 ‘The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organisation of
the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people
living together for this purpose.… This space does not always exist, and although all men are
capable of deed and word, most of them … do not live in it.’ Arendt, Human Condition, 198-99.
24 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an Inquiry into a Category of
Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989).
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As it may well foster illiberal sentiments, or merely routine habits, civil society is
not necessarily conducive to democratisation. Nor can it provide democracy with
the legitimation that deliberative practices lend it because of their reaching nor-
mative outcomes through an open and egalitarian process of critique.25 The pub-
lic sphere, consisting of both deliberative and contesting practices, can meet the
neorepublican concern about the political burden of citizenship, which out-a-
chieves the rights discourse of liberalism. The republican tradition defines self-
rule in common as well as individual terms, and makes the citizen responsible for
helping sustain a free res publica.
My distinction indeed gives us a purchase on some of the problems of the Arab
Spring, as well as of democratisation processes elsewhere, including the West.
Sheri Berman commented, in 2003, on Egypt’s potential for regime change. She
focused on the growth of Egyptian civil society from the nineties onwards, follow-
ing the failure of state provisions. It resulted in a strongly developed civil society
run by Islamist groups, covering religious as well as social organisations, provid-
ing social life with services withheld by the state. She concludes ‘that what Egypt
and many other Arab countries need most at this point is not stronger civil soci-
eties, but rather more effective and responsive political institutions.’26 A similar
critique of civil society, addressing various corners of the world, comes from
Andrea Cornwall and Anne Marie Goetz. They review the strategies of develop-
ment agencies which aim for democratisation by strengthening civil society
organisations, and analyse what they mean for women’s empowerment. ‘The rosy
democratizing ideals associated with civil society sit awkwardly with the realities
of NGOs’ permeability to, and indeed reproduction of, existing political culture.’27
Such organisations ‘may offer women little scope to develop their political
agency.’ They may pose cultural obstacles for women’s participation, consisting in
the subjects deemed permissible for deliberation, the language of public debate,
or deliberative forums asking ‘participants to demonstrate altruism and to reach
consensus, especially since women may be socialized into a surrender of self-
interest.’28 Such cultural obstacles have, meanwhile, been pointed out with
respect to public spheres in Western democracies as well. They appear in a range
of feminist problematisations of public sphere theory, such as Iris Young’s call for
a politics of culture that counters cultural and linguistic dominance in public
spheres.29
If Arendt alerted to the always imminent disappearance of public sphere, Haber-
mas saw a decline of publicity through its colonisation by market forces. The fem-
25 A useful discussion of this Habermasian tenet is Seyla Benhabib, ‘Toward a Deliberative Model of
Democratic Legitimacy,’ in her Democracy and Difference. Contesting the Boundaries of the Political
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-87.
26 Sheri Berman, ‘Islamism, Revolution and Civil Society,’ Perspectives on Politics 1 (2) (2003): 266.
27 Andrea Cornwall & Anne Marie Goetz, ‘Democratizing Democracy: Feminist Perspectives,’
Democratization 12 (5) (2005): 791.
28 Ibidem, 792-93.
29 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990).
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inist perspectives spell out a further caveat. While the public sphere might be less
prone to the naturalising propensity of civil society, due to its self-imposed voca-
tion for contesting dominance, it is likewise at risk of perpetuating the marginali-
sation of specific subjects.30 Still, if democracy has discursive and pragmatic
resources that belie the free market ideology, its publicity is indeed the category
to consult. It stands out as the one cooperative practice that could fulfil the cru-
cial condition for addressing dominance or hegemony within democratic orders.
Such dominance may or may not result from democracy’s colonisation by the
market. It may refer to forms of cultural hegemony, birth into lower classes, lack
of juridical means, and so forth. We may conclude that the subject’s social free-
dom, as pleaded by Winter, is both the object of and jeopardised by public action.
Let us look further at how individuals’ wishes for freedom can nevertheless be
seen to dovetail with the public sphere’s vocation to sustain liberty. But then, we
will also see how the market society generates unexpected angles on the freedom
promised us by democracy.
3 Situating Selves: the Vicissitudes of Authority in Market Society
The missing field of publicity is the more pressing in the light of Winter’s critique
of subjectivism. He offers us an attractive alternative ontology of subjectivity,
which is to provide a cure for our atomistic and alienated mind sets, but simulta-
neously fails to indicate any clear venue for bringing it about. As has been pointed
out, the public sphere would provide such a venue, although it does not as such
solve, and may rather reveal, the hindrances to freedom or emancipation that our
subjectivities are to encounter. This invites to further reflect on the various
meanings of negative freedom. As this involves a reflection on authority (negative
freedom’s pet peeve), I will add a discussion on the intricate, gendered symbolics
of authority that plague both the market and the public sphere.
In Winter’s discussion of situated selves, negative freedom is again understood in
a merely pejorative sense, as denoting isolated and alienated individuals. I would
like to point out more positive uses of the concept – both on the political and the
subjective level. Let me first of all remark that its political necessity is undisputa-
ble for democrats – we don’t want the state arbitrarily interfering with our homes
or persons. (This straightforward political meaning of the concept is neglected by
Winter.) Winter’s psychological or mental application of the concept however,
presents more intricate issues. When negative freedom signifies solipsistic adven-
tures that keep the other and the social at bay, a democracy indeed becomes an
unattractive place to live in. But yet, wanting freedom from others’ unwanted
interference has been a mighty incentive for many anti-authoritarian politics.
These include not merely those directed at the state and its juridical means of
30 Anne Phillips, for instance, points out that political participation not necessarily benefits per-
sonal freedom. See her ‘The Politicisation of Difference: Does This Make for a More Intolerant
Society?,’ in Toleration, Identity & Difference, ed. John Horton & Susan Mendus (London: Macmil-
lan, 1999), 126-45.
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enforcement, or those aiming for marketised modes of liberty, but also those
directed towards the social and the private. John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, from
1859, could be considered their bible (besides the longstanding, and much earlier,
anarchist and utopian bodies of critique). All modes of enforcement of behaviour,
whether majoritarian, private or cultural ones, are to be ousted from liberal dem-
ocratic spaces and minds, as Mill adamantly argued.
How then to deal with the many-sided life of negative freedom? To sort the vari-
ous claims involved, a distinction made by Philip Pettit may come in handy.31 He
reconstructs a tradition of thinking towards negative freedom, not from the mod-
ern liberal, but the civic republican tradition. Here negative freedom does not sig-
nify freedom from interference, but from domination – its motive is the republi-
can resentment of slavery. This specific concept of negative freedom discounts
that dominance may exist without actual interference, for being imminent (as
even a ‘good’ master is still a master), or internalised. Moreover, interference may
serve the diminishing of domination. Republicanism, then, makes ‘interference’
– both the state’s and the citizen’s – not contrary to, but part and parcel of its
quest for freedom. This negative freedom concept is relevant vis-à-vis state-relat-
ed as well as personal concerns for freedom. It can be applied both in terms of
political and social freedom, and in terms of a personal, mental or psychological
wish.
Securing a social form of freedom brings struggles for such a freedom, which we
may translate as struggles against hegemony and dominance. This was of course
Hegel’s point in constructing recognition as a struggle for moral self-develop-
ment, rather than as a rationally deliberated moral imperative in Kantian vein.32
The problem seems to be that securing recognition has human sociality as its
premise and promise – it is in between those two that the struggle unfolds. We
want and need recognition because we are social selves and lack acceptable social-
31 Philip Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997). A similar argument is developed in Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Skinner formulates the republican concept of free-
dom as a social concept of freedom: ‘In a manner that contrasts sharply with modern liberal indi-
vidualism [the republican writers] not only connect social freedom with self-government, but
also link the idea of personal liberty with that of virtuous public service.’ Quentin Skinner, ‘The
Republican Ideal of Political Liberty,’ in Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed. Gisela Bock, Quentin
Skinner, & Maurizio Virioli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 306.
32 Hegel is often criticised for portraying this moral development as an intrapsychic dialectic rather
than a social dynamic. Axel Honneth has argued with this reading, and construed an angle to
social struggle for recognition from Hegel’s earlier texts, rather than from the Phenomenology of
Spirit and its master-slave dialectics. See Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral
Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). I cannot go into this matter here,
nor into the respective merits of Hegel’s and Kant’s approaches of recognition, which each have a
fair relevance for the topic of social freedom. It is, by the way, still instructive to read Frantz
Fanon’s Hegelian inspired notions of Arab revolutions – also ‘empiricising Hegel’, so to say. ‘The
consciousness of self is not the closing of a door to communication. Philosophic thought teaches
us, on the contrary, that it is its guarantee.’ Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Harmonds-
worth: Penguin, 1967), 199.
Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 2012 (41) 3 289
Judith Vega
ity. But what to struggle for? We may readily agree that the self is socially situ-
ated; we are indeed not born a woman (or man) but made into one.33 But that
ontological premise does not already indicate a normative orientation: it announ-
ces the problem, not the solution. What woman to become, where to locate its
sites of production, which roads for being and action to follow? Social movements
and organisations offer a podium for the development of self, and some orienta-
tion for it. But they may in themselves again be deeply problematic as to their
constructionist labours and normative framings of the self. Winter appears to
imply that merely recognising the social construction of self and psyche is already
a salutary matter. But if it creates better philosophy, it does not necessarily pre-
dict better societies. Moreover, the mere pronouncement of embedded selves
conceals the different configurations of this embedment – and embodiment, for
that matter – in gender respect. The solipsistic and transcendental ego of mod-
ernity criticised by Winter has been masculinely connotated; women, and proba-
bly a great many non-white people of all genders, had different ego-ideals to con-
tend with. Winter seems to side with a longstanding feminist critique, but then
neglects to remark on its details.
On that note, let me further reflect on Winter’s contrast between market and
democracy as harbouring different ‘political ego-ideals’. Both categories have
again different turnouts as to the gendering of these ideals. From a feminist per-
spective, democracy may harbour many traps, and the market may contain cer-
tain – I grant, ambivalent – blessings. I will end by offering some gender-specific
history of the market and consumerism that demonstrate modes of acquiring
freedom which, while seemingly following its paradigm, still deviate from free-
dom’s ‘main line’ as carved out by Winter.
For all the present global market’s crimes and sins, the market has not always
been described in the essentially narcissistic and alienating terms that Winter
attributes to it. Rather, it was initially set over and against politics, precisely for
its capacity for calm and impassioned deliberation. Competitive and aggressive
passions were, conversely, associated with politics. The eighteenth-century Scot-
tish view of the market rather aligned with what Winter ascribes to democracy: it
would operate in ‘calm passions’ and peaceful cooperation – it was politics that
would ensue in a violent mess.34 Of course we sobered up: we have slavery, abuse
and alienation abound on our global markets. But history continued to provide
gendered symbolics of market and democracy, which render problematic a too
easy view of their oppositional moralities.
33 I here obviously refer to Simone de Beauvoir’s famous sentence ‘On ne naît pas femme, on le
devient’, from Le deuxième sexe, published in 1949.
34 See e.g., Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests. Political Arguments for Capitalism
before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). A large feminist literature has
pointed out a similar sentiment, while critically addressing its (explicitly) gendered fram-
ing – commercial society would provide a softer, less belligerent, ‘feminised’ society. Also see
Vega, Inventing Enlightenment’s Gender and ‘Enlightenment’s Differences, Today’s Identities’.
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The nineteenth century again saw a different – and not altogether dated – view
on the market come about. A debate emerged on consumerism, not as harmonis-
ing with, but precisely outstepping the liberal subject’s rational and interested
political habitus. Now the consumer market – rather than politics – came to re-
present excess, loss of reason, passion and femininity. Consumerism announced a
quarrel with the rational, self-interested, calculating individuals that were to fill a
proper liberal democracy. Where the nineteenth-century algorithm of consumer-
ism became women-passion-excess, shopping came to stand for irrationality and
a threat to masculine authority, a trespassing of patriarchal moral and sexual
norms. In that sense the department store, that quintessential space of seduc-
tion, delights and semi-legitimate public presence, could be said to have constitut-
ed a novel and exciting public sphere for women.35 If anything, to employ the
psychoanalytic framing of transformative processes, the imaginary was pitted
powerfully against the symbolic.
The twentieth century again followed with a view of consumers as principally pas-
sive, duped and alienated. If not merely applicable to women, this did repeat the
earlier coding of irrationality, and nonconformity to democratic ideals. It was
this, roughly neo-marxist, view that provoked novel, alternative approaches of
consumers as negotiators or resisters. We find such approaches of the consumer
in the wide field of cultural theory: from the philosophy of everyday life (e.g., by
Henry Lefebvre or Michel de Certeau), to cultural studies in the spirit of Stuart
Hall. There may be protest involved in consumerism. If we do not merely look at
it as substantiating manipulated choice, we can appreciate that it may give rise to
specifically modern, and surely late-modern, practices of action and judgement.
This is not to redeem consumerism, evidently; and let’s not forget that the
department store also projects back to women the images of woman as mass-pro-
duced object. Nevertheless, mapping the troubling gendered significations of
democracy and market throws many doubts on the kind of bifurcated analysis
presented by Winter. It reveals one dimension of democracy’s proper, problem-
atic gender politics.
The remarks above show the difficulty of Winter’s forbidding take on negative
freedom. This concept covers modes and practices of freedom yearnings that, if
dismissed, would cause us to miss empirically pertinent struggles for social free-
dom. The notion of socially situated selves does not by itself provide sufficient
normative orientations. What it does seem to predict for democracy is a certain
mode of social struggle – a struggle about those aspects of their social construc-
tions that the selves choose to challenge or deconstruct, in the face of diverse
forms of social and cultural hegemony.
35 See Rita Felski, The Gender of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
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4 The Throes of Spring – Globally
Instead of merely contrasting liberal and social democracy, I have drawn out some
paradoxes that beset both liberal and social democracy, and that complicate their
supposed incompatibility. If we want to defend social democracy from democ-
racy’s colonisation by the market, the best way seems to keep pointing out that
liberal theory actually is an internally divided body of thought, and is both tasked
and taxed by keeping up some sort of balance between liberty and equality.
Furthermore, liberal theory leads to fuzzy democratic practices in which liberal
tenets perform a variety of psychological and political functions. It is precisely
from the multifarious fact of their social situatedness, that individuals may come
to embrace some mode of individualist libertarianism. Revolutions show how
strong a social motivator this wish may be – for men and women. The libertarian
discourse, in the sense of the desire for, or phantasy of, a radical break with cer-
tain forms of dominance, may arise with respect to various impetuses and ration-
ales, and take on various forms: political, economic, personal, sexual. It may be
moulded in economic forms – against centralist state economies; in political anar-
chist forms – against autocratic power; in erotic forms – against sexual repres-
siveness; in personal forms – against moralistic forms of sociality, religious, ideo-
logical or otherwise. The question whether we judge these as legitimate roads to
social freedom cannot be answered by recourse to one analytical concept of lib-
erty, not calibrated on an understanding of the empirical contexts from which
such claims arise. The wish for liberty, in the case of our present democracy,
should indeed be rescued from its capture by the fundamentalist economistic
phantasy of ‘doing your own thing.’ If the concept of social democracy signposts
‘freedom’s better line,’ it is because of its insistence on democracy as a moral prac-
tice, rather than a mere aggregative or interest-based form of social organisation.
But this may, and should, involve pertinent desires for negative freedom. In any
case, we will need to historicise, and specify empirically, the range of answers to
unfreedom that the world is showing us, whether inspired by wishes for negative
or positive freedom.
My remarks have in part issued from the challenges presented to a ‘neat picture’
of liberal democracy by the critical dialogues between democracy and feminism,
such that have been in place for more than two centuries by now. In comparing
and judging democratic practices or revolts, these dialogues are too often absent.
The commentaries published during the last year are hardly optimistic accounts
of the Arab Spring’s potential for democracy, sexually and otherwise. They invari-
antly point to the economic, institutional and cultural hurdles to be over-
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come – in very different scenarios for the various countries involved.36 Most of
the doubts converge on the problem of how to erect a democratic civil society in
these countries with strong statist or/and authoritarian traditions. The Middle
East revolts also beg the revisiting of available, and probably the drawing of
novel, gender perspectives in such situations. If we want to aid them with ana-
lyses of and judgements on their present and future predicaments, we would do
well to revisit our own historical and contemporary troubled conceptions of
democracy, and keep alive the global dialogues on sexually democratic societies.
For real-world democracies may all be defined as essentially works in progress;
they will keep struggling with the ‘we’ that they will represent and empower.
36 E.g., Robert Springborg, ‘The Political Economy of the Arab Spring,’ Mediterranean Politics 16 (3)
(2011): 427-33; idem, ‘Whither the Arab Spring? 1989 or 1848?,’ The International Spectator: Ital-
ian Journal of International Affairs 46 (3) (2011): 5-12; Abdelwahab El-Affendi, ‘Constituting Lib-
erty, Healing the Nation: Revolutionary Identity Creation in the Arab World’s Delayed 1989,’
Third World Quarterly 32 (7) (2011): 1255-71; Tarek Masoud, ‘Liberty, Democracy, and Discord in
Egypt,’ The Washington Quarterly 34 (4) (2011): 117-29; Lisa Anderson, ‘Demystifying the Arab
Spring,’ Foreign Affairs 90 (3) (2011): 2-7.
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